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SUPPLEMENTARY  REPORT 


V 


IN  REPLY  TO  THE 


COMMENTS  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 


UPON  THE 


MINORITY  REPORT  OF  THE  SELECT  COMMITTEE 
ON  THE  PACIFIC  RAILROAD, 


MR.  KIDWBLLjOF  VIRGINIA. 


WASHINGTON  : 

CORNELIUS  WENDELL,  PRINTER. 

1857. 


1 


O*  fn  *nk  r  Z  £)  -U 


3  IS.  IV-  X 

K  5  H-l  p 

34th  Congress,  )  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  (  Mis.  Doc. 
Zd  Session.  $  {  No.  44. 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


SUPPLEMENTARY  REPORT 


IN  REPLY  TO  THE 

COMMENTS  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 


UPON  THE 

Minority  report  submitted  by  Mr.  Kidwdl ,  of  the  Select  Committee  on 

the  Pacific  Railroad. 


February  12,  1857. — Ordered  to  be  printed. 


In  a  Minority  Report  submitted  to  the  House  of  Representatives  at 
the  first  session  of  the  present  Congress,  reasons  were  submitted  to 
show  why  the  estimates  of  the  engineers  employed  on  the  reconnais¬ 
sances  and  surveys  for  railroads  from  the  river  Mississippi  to  the  Pa¬ 
cific  ocean  ought  not  to  be  considered  wholly  reliable. 

One  of  those  reasons  having  been  unfavorably  commented  upon  by 
the  Secretary  of  War  in  his  last  annual  report  to  the  President,  and 
by  the  President  laid  before  the  House,  it  is  deemed  proper  to  submit 
a  few  remarks  in  reply  to  the  Secretary,  and  in  further  explication  of 
the  original  action  of  the  Secretary  under  the  act  authorizing  the  re¬ 
connaissances  and  surveys. 

Captain  A.  A.  Humphreys,  topographical  engineer,  seems  also  to 
have  felt  himself  called  upon  to  publish  a  pamphlet,  the  principal 
object  of  which  appears  to  be  a  disparagement  of  the  minority  report 
and  a  vicarious  defence  of  Lieutenant  WLipple.  Such  observations 
will  be  submitted  upon  this  publication  as  are  deemed  likely  to  call 
the  attention  of  Congress  to  important  controverted  points. 

Among  the  several  points  proposed  to  be  considered,  in  reply  to  the 
principal  and  auxiliary  criticisms  upon  the  minority  report,  are  the 
following : 

1st.  That  the  Secretary,  in  deciding  upon  the  routes  to  be  examined 
by  the  engineers,  did  great  injustice  to  the  middle  States,  especially 
to  the  fifteen  southern  States — to  California,  and  to  the  Nation. 

2d.  That,  so  far  as  can  be  seen  from  the  reports  thus  far  printed, 
the  Secretary  decided  which  of  the  routes  was  the  best ,  and  gave  his 
reasons  for  the  decision,  before  the  detailed  calculations  of  the  engi¬ 
neers  had  been  made — before  the  surveys  had  been  sufficiently  ex- 

45920 


2 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


amined  to  enable  the  engineers  to  detect  errors  even  when  they 
amounted  to  eighty-one  millions  of  dollars  ;  and  that  the  decision, 
based  on  such  hasty  and  incorrect  calculations,  was  not  made,  as  it  turns 
out,  in  favor  of  either  the  shortest,  the  cheapest,  the  best  settled,  the 
most  central,  or  the  most  convenient  route,  but,  as  shown  by  the 
printed  reports,  inferior  to  another  route  in  each  of  those  particulars.  ' 

3d.  That  the  estimates,  as  was  then  supposed,  are  not  only  “  unre¬ 
liable,’  '  but  must  surely  mislead  those  who  rely  upon  them,  as  they 
did  the  Secretary  of  War  ;  and  that  Captain  Humphreys  is  mistaken 
when  he  assumes  that  the  suppositions  of  the  minority  report  in  this 
regard  are  inconsistent  with  the  facts. 

4th.  That  the  estimates  of  Captain  Humphreys  himself  are  incon¬ 
siderate,  and  not  of  a  character  that  would  justify  either  Congress  or 
a  railroad  company  in  relying  upon  them. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  the  foregoing  and  other  topics,  it  is 
proper  to  give  expression  to  the  embarrassment  felt  in  consequence  of 
the  want  of  a  good  map,  exhibiting  in  detail  the  several  routes  which 
the  Secretary  of  War,  in  pursuance  of  the  authority  conferred  by  the 
act  of  March  3,  1853,  caused  to  be  examined  by  the  army  engineers. 
Although  nearly  four  years  have  passed,  the  “ elaborate  map”  of  that 
portion  of  the  United  States  lying  west  of  the  great  lakes  and  of  the 
Mississippi  river,  which  near  two  years  ago  the  Secretary  informed 
Congress  was  “being  compiled,”  and  was  “  in  an  advanced  state,”  is 
not  yet  within  the  reach  of  the  several  members  of  the  two  houses. 
The  Secretary  has  furnished  Congress  with  a  substitute,  of  which  a 
note  to  it  says:  “This  map  is  a  hurried  compilation  of  all  the  au¬ 
thentic  surveys,  and  is  designed  to  exhibit  the  relations  of  the  differ¬ 
ent  routes  to  each  other.”  The  following  remarks  are  based  upon  the 
representations  made  upon  that  map,  it  being  impossible  to  refer  to 
the  one  not  yet  obtainable. 

It  is  also  due  to  all  concerned  that  the  deference  felt  for  the  high 
scientific  attainments  of  the  military  engineers  of  the  American  army 
should  be  expressed  in  unreserved  terms.  And  it  is  also  felt  to  be 
equally  due  to  Congress  and  to  the  undersigned  to  say,  with  equal 
unreserve,  that  it  is  believed  to  be  improper  to  repose  the  same  confi¬ 
dence  in  the  abstract  opinions  and  theoretical  estimates  of  merely 
scientific  gentlemen,  who  are  known  to  be  practically  unacquainted 
with  railroad  building,  that  it  would  be  proper  to  repose  in  the 
matured  opinions  and  careful  estimates  of  practical  and  experienced 
railroad  engineers.  It  would  not  be  more  unreasonable  to  require 
railroad  engineers  to  conduct  an  army,  or  superintend  a  siege,  in  per¬ 
fect  accordance  with  all  the  rules  of  the  military  schools,  than  it  would 
be  to  demand  of  army  engineers  a  perfect  display  of  knowledge  of  the 
art  of  laying  oui  and  building  railroads  in  the  best  and  most  eco¬ 
nomical  manner,  and  to  estimate  the  business  they  would  be  likely 
to  transact  when  built. 

Congress,  on  the  3d  March,  1853,  directed,  by  law,  that  such  “  ex¬ 
plorations  and  surveys”  should  be  made  as  might  be  deemed  neces¬ 
sary  to  “  ascertain  the  most  practicable  and  economical  route  fora 
railroad  from  the  Mississippi  river  to  the  Pacific  ocean.” 

The  execution  of  this  order  was  entrusted  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


3 


Previous  knowledge  of  the  country  to  he  explored  was  limited. 
But  it  was  known  that  two  parallel  ranges  of  mountains  extended  from 
north  to  south,  quite  across  the  country  to  he  passed  over  ;  and  that 
the  most  eastern  range  (the  Rocky  mountains)  was  very  high  between 
the  38th  and  39th  parallels  of  latitude,  hut  fell  off  to  much  lower  alti¬ 
tudes  both  north  and  south  of  those  parallels.  By  going  north  as  far 
as  the  42d  degree,  it  was  Jcnoivn  that  the  mountains  could  he  crossed  at 
an  elevation  of  about  8,000  feet ;  by  going  south  to  the  35th  degree, 
it  was  believed  the  mountains  could  he  crossed  at  a  still  lower  eleva¬ 
tion.  The  route  of  the  first  lay  north  of  a  line  drawn  through  the 
centre  of  the  northern  States  ;  the  route  of  the  second  lay  south  of  a 
line  drawn  through  the  centre  of  the  southern  States.  A  line  drawn 
from  San  Francisco  due  east  to  the  Atlantic  ocean,  would  pass  near 
Richmond  and  strike  the  Atlantic  a  little  north  of  Norfolk  ;  it  would 
pass  the  Rocky  mountains  at  a  point  nearly  equidistant  from  the  South 
Pass  on  the  north,  and  Albuquerque  on  the  south. 

Colonel  Fremont  had  ascertained,  by  a  series  of  barometrical  obser¬ 
vations,  that  the  Rocky  mountain  range  gradually  rose  as  he  went 
south  from  the  South  Pass,  in  north  latitude  42°  17',  until,  in  about 
latitude  39°,  it  attains  an  elevation  of  11,000  feet,  or  more  than 
two  miles  high.  Numerous  observations,  taken  by  Dr.  Wislizenus, 
Captain  Sitgreaves,  and  others,  had  also  shown  that,  in  latitudes  35° 
and  36°,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Albuquerque,  the  height  of  the 
Rocky  mountains  was  not  only  not  so  great  as  in  latitude  39°,  but 
probably  not  so  great  as  at  the  South  Pass.  At  El  Passo,  still  fur¬ 
ther  south,  and  at  the  North  Pass,  in  the  extreme  north,  they  were 
known  to  be  still  lower. 

With  this  knowledge  before  him,  the  Secretary  of  War  directed  the 
exploration  of  a  route  near  the  British  line  on  the  north  ;  one  near 
the  Mexican  line  on  the  south  ;  one  over  the  highest  part  of  the  Rocky 
mountains  near  the  39th  parallel ;  and  one  from  Fort  Smith  (on  the 
Arkansas  river)  through  Albuquerque,  along  or  near  the  35th  parallel 
of  latitude. 

No  survey  was  made  of  the  South  Pass,  nor  of  a  route  from  St. 
Louis  to  Albuquerque.  A  thorough  exploration  of  the  Sierra  Ne¬ 
vada,  for  a  reasonable  distance  north  and  south  of  San  Francisco,  to 
ascertain  whether  passable,  was  not  made.  Scarcely  anything  addi¬ 
tional  was  ascertained  in  relation  to  the  size,  course,  and  value  of  the 
Colorado  river,  though  it  is  supposed  to  drain  a  country  of  vast  ex¬ 
tent  ;  of  its  affluents,  crossing  places,  &c.,  &c.,  little  additional  infor¬ 
mation  was  sought  or  obtained.  Whether  the  Mohave  river  sinks  into 
the  ground ,  or  empties  into  the  Colorado,  is  unknown  to  the  explorers, 
though  its  course,  so  far  as  it  is  known,  is  along  the  line  of  a  main 
route  of  survey ! 

Such  the  routes  that  were  ordered  to  be  surveyed  to  obtain  know¬ 
ledge  for  the  use  of  the  national  legislature  :  along  the  British  line; 
along  the  Mexican  line  ;  over  the  highest  part  of  the  Rocky  moun¬ 
tains  ;  and  from  an  (at  present)  inaccessible  point  on  the  west  line  of 
Arkansas,  along  the  35th  parallel ! 

To  advantageously  conduct  the  trade  and  travel  of  the  population 
of  the  cities  and  States  of  the  Atlantic,  Gulf,  and  Lake  frontiers  to 


4 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


San  Francisco,  the  great  mart  of  our  Pacific  possessions,  who  would 
locate  a  road  over  the  top  of  Coo  cha-topa  ?  or  would  run  from  the 
Mississippi  river  to  the  British  line,  ten  or  eleven  degrees  of  latitude 
north  of  San  Francisco,  and  then  run  back  south  as  many  more?  or 
run  from  the  Mississippi  to  a  point  six  or  seven  hundred  miles  south 
of  San  Francisco,  near  the  Mexican  line,  instead  of  leaving  the  Missis¬ 
sippi  river  from  a  point  reasonably  Central  to  the  Nation ,  and  proceeding 
to  the  point  sought  as  neaidy  direct  as  the  configuration  of  the  country 
would  allow  ? 

In  1853  it  was  known  that  the  heights  and  snows  of  the  Kocky 
mountains  could  only  be  avoided  by  going  south  of  an  east  and  west 
line  drawn  across  the  geographical  centre  of  the  United  States.  To 
avoid  extreme  heights  and  obstructing  snows,  and  yet  keep  the  road 
upon  a  line  nearly  central  to  the  States,  and  connecting  with  steam¬ 
boat  and  railroad  conveyances,  was  a  desideratum  so  perfectly  obvious 
that  no  Secretary,  however  inexperienced,  could  possibly  overlook  it. 

St.  Louis  is  a  point  as  far  south  as  the  majority  of  the  population 
of  the  United  States  ought  to  be  required  to  go  to  find  the  eastern  ter¬ 
minus  of  a  government  road  from  the  Mississippi  river  to  San  Francisco , 
if  a  feasible  route  could  be  found  lying  far  enough  north  to  justify  an 
eastern  terminus  at  that  city.  This  is  a  truth  that  all  intelligent  men 
can  apprehend  and  must  acknowledge. 

When  the  surveys  were  ordered  by  Congress,  it  was  firmly  believed, 
and  loudly  asserted  by  certain  representatives  of  the  States  of  Cali¬ 
fornia  and  Missouri,  that  the  best  route  from  the  Mississippi  would 
he  found  beginning  at  St.  Louis,  and  running  via  Albuquerque  on 
to  San  Francisco — a  route  nearly  central  (though  a  little  south)  to 
population  and  to  business,  north  and  south.  Yet  those  gentlemen, 
as  results  show,  were  unable  to  persuade  the  Secretary  to  survey  a 
route  which,  if  found  practicable,  would  be  the  most  central  and 
convenient  of  any.  On  the  contrary,  he  preferred  to  order,  and  did 
order,  the  money  appropriated  by  Congress  to  be  expended  in  survey¬ 
ing  a  route,  the  stupendous  heights  of  which  were  already  known, 
not  only  from  the  fact  that  on  it  four  great  rivers  took  their  rise,  and 
flowed  in  opposite  directions,  but  also  from  the  actual  barometrical 
measurements  of  Colonel  Fremont.  True,  the  35th  parallel  route 
was  also  surveyed  ;  but  it  was  started  from  a  point  which  is  neither 
accessible  nor  convenient  to  the  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  and  thus  was  rendered  unattractive  to  them.  True,  it  was 
started  from  a  place  which,  in  a  few  years,  will  be  peculiarly  conve¬ 
nient  and  accessible  to  the  majority  of  the  people  of  the  southern 
States  ;  but  not  being  so  to  the  noithern  part  of  the  southern  States, 
nor  to  any  of  the  northern  States,  such  a  route  (like  the  one  along  the 
Mexican  line,  or  the  one  along  the  British  line)  could  never  be  desirable 
to  the  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

A  right  line  drawn  between  New  York  and  Albuquerque  would 
pass  through  St.  Louis.  And  yet  Baltimore  is  nearer  to  St.  Louis 
than  is  New  York,  and  Charleston  is  nearer  than  Baltimore.  So  is 
Bichmond,  and  Savannah,  and  Pensacola.  St.  Louis  is,  therefore, 
eligibly  situated. 

A  road  from  St,  Louis,  via  Albuquerque,  to  San  Francisco,  would 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


5 


avoid,  it  was  supposed,  extreme  heights,  extreme  heat,  and  the  deep 
snows.  A  road  from  Albuquerque,  via  Fort  Smith,  to  Memphis,  and 
one  from  Albuquerque  to  St  Louis,  ivould  have  a  common  stem  a  consid¬ 
erable  distance ;  if  one  is  built,  both  ought  to  he.  The  line  of  Continental 
Hoad  most  convenient  to  the  fifteen  southern  States ,  taken  as  a  unit ,  be¬ 
gins  in  Charleston ,  and  runs  to  San  Francisco ,  through  the  toivns  of 
Memphis ,  Little  Rock ,  Fort  Smith ,  Anton  Chico,  and  Albuquerque ,  and 
has  a  fork  to  St.  Louis.  Whereas  a  road  built  from  Charleston,  via 
Vicksburg,  Shreevesport,  and  El  Paso,  to  San  Francisco,  whilst  it 
might  accommodate  Texas,  New  Orleans,  and  the  southern  portions 
of  Mississippi,  Alabama,  Georgia,  South  Carolina,  and  Florida,  is 
not  so  convenient  to  the  northern  portions  of  Mississippi,  Alabama, 
Georgia,  South  Carolina,  or  any  part  of  North  Carolina,  eastern  Vir¬ 
ginia,  Kentucky,  or  Tennessee,  as  is  the  Memphis,  Fort  Smith,  and 
Albuquerque  road  ;  and  the  States  of  Delaware,  Maryland,  and  the 
western  part  of  Virginia,  and  all  of  Missouri  are  best  accommodated 
by  a  road  not  south  of  one  beginning  at  Norfolk,  and  running  through 
Richmond,  Cincinnati,  St.  Louis,  and  Albuquerque,  to  San  Francisco. 

The  mass  of  the  population,  business,  and  wealth,  and  the  greater 
part  of  the  geographical  area  of  the  fifteen  southern  States,  lie  north 
of  a  line  drawn  fifty  miles  south  of,  and  parallel  with,  the  Charleston, 
Memphis,  Fort  Smith,  and  Albuquerque  road ;  that  line  of  road  is  very 
accessible  to  each  of  the  southern  States  at  some  point  or  other  before  it 
reaches  the  east  line  of  New  Mexico.  Not  so  with  the  extreme  southern 
border  road ;  it  would  he  a  hardship  to  compel  even  the  business  man 
of  Charleston  to  go  into  the  southwestern  part  of  the  Gadsden  Pur¬ 
chase,  instead  of  proceeding  north  of  west  directly  to  San  Francisco  ; 
and  if  it  would  he  a  hardship  to  a  Charleston  man  to  take  the  extreme 
southern  route,  what  would  it  not  he  to  all  the  people  of  North  Caro¬ 
lina,  Virginia,  Maryland,  Delaware,  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  Missouri, 
and  such  other  portions  of  the  country  as  lie  along,  or  north  of,  the 
parallel  of  the  35th  degree  of  north  latitude  ?  To  go  to  San  Francisco, 
they  would  he  compelled  to  cross  the  Albuquerque  route  and  go  more 
than  two  hundred  miles  south,  and  then  return  back  to  it,  to  reach  San 
Fraticisco  !  The  extreme  southern  cities,  even  Galveston,  can  reach 
San  Francisco  as  readily  by  the  Albuquerque  route  as  any  other,  or 
nearly  so — in  many  cases  more  readily  than  by  any  other.  But  the 
entire  northern  and  the  middle  portions  (being  largely  more  than  one- 
half)  of  the  population  of  the  south  would  find  their  road  greatly 
elongated,  if  compelled  to  go  down  the  Mississippi  two  hundred  miles 
to  he  able  to  start  on  the  road  to  San  Francisco.  Memphis  is  about 
one  hundred  or  one  hundred  and  twenty  miles  south  of  San  Francisco  ; 
it  is  a  hardship  to  require  people  living  north  of  Memphis  to  unneces¬ 
sarily  go  still  further  south  when  they  ought  to  he  travelling  north. 
St.  Louis  is  about  eighty  miles  north  of  San  Francisco  ;  St.  Louis  is 
too  far  north,  and  Memphis  too  far  south. 

The  route  which  will  best  accommodate  the  fifteen  southern  States 
is  thus  seen  to  he  the  bifurcated  one,  starting  from  St.  Louis  and  from 
Memphis,  and  uniting  in  the  valley  of  the  Canadian.  It  is  the  best, 
because  it  is  the  most  convenient  to  them  ;  it  is  also  the  best  for  the 
south,  because  it  admirably  accommodates  every  State  in  the  Union,  and 


6 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


thus  would  be  more  deserving  of,  and  more  likely  to  command,  success. 
St.  Louis  will  be  easy  of  access  to  all  places  in  the  United  States  lying 
north  of  the  Ohio  and  James  rivers  as  soon  as  the  road  from  Richmond 
to  Cincinnati  is  finished.  To  secure  the  construction  of  this  central 
southern  route  along  the  35th  parallel,  it  was  indispensable  that  it 
should  he  made  accessible  and  convenient  to  the  population  of  the 
States  lying  north  of  it ;  and  this  could  only  he  done  by  a  road  from 
St.  Louis.  In  failing  to  make  this  road  accessible  to  a  majority  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  the  Secretary,  if  his  object  was  to  advance 
the  interests  of  the  South ,  failed  to  effect  his  object ;  and,  in  failing, 
has  injured  the  South  he  sought  to  serve.  If  his  object  was  not  Sec¬ 
tional,  but  was  National,  then  his  failure  was  still  more  signal;  for  he 
failed  to  survey  a  route  that  would  furnish  a  connexion  to  the  majority 
of  the  population  of  the  United  States  with  what  he  had  good  reason, 
as  an  intelligent  man,  to  believe  would  prove  to  he  the  best  and  most 
convenient  of  all  the  proposed  routes.  Whether  the  road  was  to  he 
for  military,  commercial,  or  social  purposes,  the  duty  was  to  so  exe¬ 
cute  his  official  trust  as  to  make  it,  if  physically  possible,  beneficial  to 
all  the  great  interests  of  the  country,  whose  common  servant  he  is. 

One  great  reason,  then,  why  the  results  of  the  surveys  are  not  re¬ 
liable”  for  national  or  sectional  legislative  purposes,  is,  that  the  routes 
surveyed  were  not  judiciously  selected  by  the  Secretary. 

Another  important  reason  is,  that,  when  selected,  the  surveys  were 
not  thorough ;  they  were  too  superficial  to  answer  the  purposes  in¬ 
tended.  This  point,  so  seriously  affecting  the  reliability  and  value 
of  the  estimates,  will  he  returned  to,  and  reasons  given  for  the 
opinion  ;  the  more  especially  as  Captain  Humphreys  wishes  to  im¬ 
press  upon  Congress  that  the  surveys  were  “  conducted  with  care  and 
thoroughness .” — (See  his  pamphlet,  p.  7.) 

Another  reason  why  the  information  obtained  by  the  engineers  is 
not  of  a  character  to  base  legislative  action  upon,  is  found  in  the  dif¬ 
fering  and  inconsistent  estimates  of  the  engineers.  In  this  connexion, 
an  extract  from  the  pamphlet  of  Captain  Humphreys  is  submitted  ; 
he  says: 

“  ‘  If  grave  mistakes  were  committed  on  a  route  [that  near  the  35th  parallel]  where  more 
care  and  more  labor  would  be  likely  to  be  bestowed  upon  estimates  of  cost  than  upon  the 
estimates  of  cost  of  the  less  important  routes  upon  each  side  of  it,  what  reliance  ought  to 
be  placed  upon  estimates  of  cost  made  up  for  routes  of  minor  importance  ?  Surely  greater  care, 
greater  labor,  and  greater  pains-taking  were  not  lib  ely  to  be  bestowed  upon  the  lesser  objects 
than  upon  the  greater.’ 

“  But  there  was  no  occasion  for  supposition  upon  the  subject,  since  all  the  facts  touching 
the  degree  of  care  bestowed  upon  the  route  of  the  35th  parallel,  and  all  other  routes,  had  been 
communicated  by  the  War  Department  to  Congress,  and  made  public  by  that  body  ;  and 
these  facts,  so  far  from  supporting  these  suppositions,  are  inconsistent  with  them  *n  every 
particular.” 

To  sustain  the  last  point  made,  and  at  the  same  time  furnish  a  com¬ 
plete  answer  to  the  attempt  of  Captain  Humphreys  to  induce  Congress 
to  believe  that  reliance  ought  to  he  placed  upon  the  estimates  of  the 
engineers,  the  following  extract  is  quoted  from  his  own  official  report : 

“The  estimate  for  cost  of  construction  is,  perhaps,  in  excess  ;  the  cost  per  mile,  from  Ful¬ 
ton,  on  Red  liver,  to  the  Rio  Grande,  a  distance  of  780  miles,  being  at  the  rate  of  $50,000 
per  mile.  On  the  Northern  route  the  estimated  mean  cost  of  the  first  780  miles  is  about 
$35,400  per  mile,  (240  miles  at  $25,000  per  mile — next,  712  miles,  at  $40,000  per  mile  ;)  yet, 
from  the  description  of  these  portions  of  the  two  routes,  it  is  evident  the  difference  in  cost  per 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


7 


mile  of  constructing  the  two  will  not  be  great.  This  is  mentioned  to  show  what  different  judg¬ 
ments  are  formed  in  making  these  estimates,  and  what  caution  should  be  used  in  being  guided 
by  estimates  in  figures  of  the  costs  of  routes  that  have  not  been  subjected  to  the  same  judg¬ 
ment  or  same  standard.  The  difference  of  estimated  cost  in  this  distance  of  780  miles  on 
roads  that  would  not  probably  vary  greatly  in  their  actual  cost  of  construction,  is  $11,700,000  ; 
and  if  the  same  difference  should  exist  throughout  the  entire  distance,  it  would  sum  up  to 
about*p5,000,000.” — (See  vol.  1,  p.  81,  quarto  edition.) 

Here  is  an  ascertained  conflict  to  the  very  serious  amount  of 
$11,700,000  ;  and,  possibly,  one  of  $35,000,000,  according  to  his  own 
account!  Does  not  this  justify  the  Minority  of  the  Committee  in 
assuming  that  the  estimates  are  “  unreliable  ?  ” 

Again  :  A  closer  examination  shows  that  Captain  Humphreys  was, 
himself,  a  large  contributor  to  the  alleged  error  of  Lieutenant  Whip¬ 
ple.  By  referring  to  page  81,  of  vol.  1,  as  before  quoted,  the  House 
will  see  that  the  captain  increased  the  estimates  of  Lieutenant  Whip¬ 
ple  $19,381,000  !  To  do  justice  to  Captain  Humphreys,  (and  to  throw 
further  light  upon  the  value  of  the  estimates,)  it  is  necessary  to  add 
that  he  also  cut  dozen  Lieutenant  Wliipple’s  estimates  (of  the  cost  of 
“  equipment”)  some  $12,000,000.  A  further  examination  of  his  re¬ 
port  shows  that  Captain  Humphreys  expects  to  earn  a  larger  income 
with  ec  one-fifth”  of  the  equipment ,  than  that  earned  by  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio,  and  other  eastern  railroads,  with  a  full  equipment !  Hence, 
when  the  estimates  of  Lieutenant  Whipple  called  for  an  equal  equip¬ 
ment  for  equal  work,  Captain  Humphreys  cut  them  down  four-fifths ! 

These  radical  differences  of  opinion  among  subordinates,  and  be¬ 
tween  the  officer  in  charge  and  the  subordinates,  show  that  the  esti¬ 
mates  are  not  founded  upon  generally  acknowledged  principles,  hut 
upon  mere  conjectures;  and  hence  are  “  unreliable.’ '  One  guesses 
that,  as  the  road  is  to  earn  more  than  the  eastern  roads,  its  equipments 
(delivered  in  that  far-off  region)  should  cost  at  least  as  much  as  the 
equipments  of  the  roads  whose  business  is  to  he  exceeded.  Another 
guesses  that  more  business  can  be  done  with  one-fifth  than  is  done  by 
eastern  roads  with  five-fifths!  The  latter  guess  or  conjecture  is  adopted, 
and  is  then  called  an  “  estimate,”  and  Congress  is  called  upon  by  the 
friends  of  a  Pacific  railroad  to  expend  its  money  upon  the  strength  of 
it !  Can  anything  he  less  u  reliable”  than  such  “  estimates?” 

The  extreme  southern  route,  stretching  along  the  Mexican  bound¬ 
ary  line,  is  well  known  to  have  many  obstacles  on  it  of  a  very  serious 
character.  Such  is  the  heat  (the  Secretary  admits)  that  in  the  hot 
season  the  cars  cannot  ordinarily  be  run.  On  this  point  the  following 
(taken  from  the  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce  of  the  6tli  of  June, 
1856,)  throws  some  light: 

“  The  atmosphere  in  the  plains  of  Utah  and  California. — Mr.  J.  Weyth,  the  old  mountaineer, 
says  the  Monterey  Sentinel,  states  the  following  fact  touching  the  aridity  of  the  air  in  these 
•elevated  regions  : 

“  ‘  The  dryness  of  our  atmosphere  was  so  great  on  one  of  the  branches  of  Powder  river,  in 
August,  1832,  that  I  could  not  discharge  one  barrel  of  my  double  percussion  gun  without 
causing  the  other  to  explode  from  the  slightly  increased  heat.  One  man  was  wounded  in  this 
way,  and  guns  several  times  exploded,  and  I  was  obliged  to  discontinue  the  practice  of 
placing  caps  on  the  guns  in  the  daytime  until  immediately  wanted  for  use.’ 

“Lieutenant  Whipple,  of  the  United  States  boundary  survey,  under  date  of  October  19, 
1849,  states  that  near  the  banks  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila  ‘  the  horn  encasing  the  reading 
lens  of  my  micrometer  of  the  zenith  sector  snapped  and  flew  from  my  fingers  in  three  pieces, 
owing  to  the  excessive  dryness  of  the  atmosphere.  All  the  wooden  boxes  in  which  the  instru¬ 
ments  were  packed  are  being  destroyed.  The  nicely  seasoned  and  well  finished  cases  of  the 
English  instruments,  made  many  years  since,  have  shrunk  so,  from  the  aridity  of  the  air,  as 
not  to  admit  the  original  contents.’  ” 


8 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


Yet,  under  such  a  sun,  upon  this  route,  so  devoid  of  water,  soil 
and  timber,  so  trying  to  machinery.  Captain  Humphreys  estimates 

nnn  ^  bmlt»  furn‘shed  and  equipped  to  do  a  business  j 
of  $17, 000, 000  per  annum,  for  $45,000  per  mile !  He  says  the 
earnings  of  the  Massachusetts  roads  amount  to  $7,713,208  ;  that 

SeqnS  a°«  urDlntg  is .  $4,541,468  leaving  a  net  profit  of 

!|>d, ^ll,  iy«.  Hut  as  the  equipment  of  the  Pacific  road  for  this  busi- 
ness,  yielding  $17,000,000  yearly,  is  merely  one-fifth  that  of  the  Mas¬ 
sachusetts  roads,  the  expense  of  working  the  road  would  he  nearly  in 
that  proportion!  He,  however,  with  a  pleasant  display  of  caution, 
finally  estimates  that  the  cost  of  working  the  road  through  that  country 
(where  supplies  even  of  water,  wood,  machinery,  provisions,  and  labor¬ 
ers  have  to  be  carried  immense  distances,)  will  be  two-fifths  of  what  it 
costs  in  Massachusetts  !  He  gravely  tells  Congress,  through  his  esti¬ 
mates,  that  that  road,  thus  destitute  of  all  supplies  of  every  kind,  can  be 
worked  so  cheaply  that  $2  on  it  will  equal  $5  in  Massachusetts  !  And 
this  prodigious  saving  is  effected  in  this  ingenious  way,  to  wit:  he  pro¬ 
poses  to  use  but  one-fifth ,  or,  at  most,  fifths  of  the  value  of  the  equip¬ 

ments  to  do  a  business  of  $17,000,000,  which  the  less  thoughtful,  more 
wasteful,  and  less  experienced  Massachusetts  railroad  men  use  to  do 
a  business  of  only  $7,000,000!  and  while  they  expend  $4,500,000  to 
earn  their  smaller  sum,  he  says  “  the  yearly  expense  of  working  the 
•Pacific  railroad  would  be  about  $4,000,000,  leaving  thirteen  millions  of 
dollars  for  the  net  earnings!”— ( See  vol.  1,  p.  101.)  If  the  engineers 
pould  do  with  but  one-tenth  of  the  equipments  used  in  Massachusetts, 
it  seems  but  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  “net  earnings  ”  would  be 
still  more  satisfactory  ! 

Passing  from  the  consideration  of  “estimates,”  into  which  the  imagi¬ 
nation  seems  to  have  so  largely  entered,  we  are  prepared  to  wonder  less 
how  the  Secretary  came  to  recommend  the  longer  and  the  worse  as 
the  shorter  and  the  best  route  from  the  Mississippi  river  to  the  Pacific 
ocean.  His  recommendations  are  very  positive. 

In  volume  1,  page  29,  the  Secretary  says  :  ’“The  route  of  the  32d 
parallel  is,  of  those  surveyed,  ‘  the  most  practicable  and  economical 
route  lor  a  railroad  from  the  Mississippi  river  to  the  Pacific  ocean.’ 
1ms  is  the  shortest  route  ;  and  not  only  is  its  estimated  cost  less  by  a 
third  than  that  of  any  other  of  the  lines,  but  the  character  of  the 
work  required  is  such  that  it  could  be  executed  in  a  vastly  shorter 
period.  Not  only  is  this  the  shortest  and  least  costly  route  to  the 
Pacific,  but  it  is  the  shortest  and  cheapest  route  to  San  Francisco.” 

The  honorable  Secretary  is  mistaken.  He  did  himself  the  injustice 
to  make  up  his  report  before  the  calculations  of  his  engineers  had  been 
completed.  It  is  surprising  that  he  did  not,  by  the  exercise  of  his 
usual  reflection,  consider  the  difficulty  of  gaining  the  long  distance 
covered  by  three  degrees  of  latitude.  A  moment’s  reflection  ought  to 
tiave  convinced  him  that  the  road  from  Memphis  to  San  Francisco  is 
reasonably  direct ;  that  the  road  from  Vicksburg,  via  El  Paso,  neces¬ 
sarily  makes  about  200  miles  of  northing  in  going  northwest  from 
the  Gadsden  Purchase  to  be  able  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  Memphis 
road  m  the  pass  leading  to  the  Tulare  valley.  It  was  evident  to  the 
most  superficial  gazer  at  a  map  that  it  was  likely  to  turn  out,  as  it 
has,  that  the  road  from  Memphis,  via  Fort  Smith  and  Albuquerque,  to 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


9 


San  Francisco,  is  shorter  than  the  favorite  border  route  of  the  Secre¬ 
tary  to  the  same  point. 

A  glance  at  the  map  also  indicated  a  far  better  route  along  the  35th 
than  along  the  32d  parallel ;  the  Secretary,  not  insensible  to  striking 
geographical  features,  speaks,  in  graphic  language,  of  “  the  extension , 
ivest  and  east,  of  the  interlocking  tributaries  of  the  Mississippi ,  the  Rio 
Grande  and  the  Colorado  of  the  west.”  This  is  true,  and  being  true, 
the  route  ought  to  have  been  considered  the  shortest,  best  watered, 
best  wooded,  levellest,  cheapest,  and  most  central,  (compared  with  the 
border  route,)  until  the  surveys  could  demonstrably  prove  the  contrary. 

The  Secretary  and  Captain  Humphreys,  by  attacking  and  attempt¬ 
ing  to  weaken  the  force  of  the  Minority  Report,  have  made  it  necessary 
to  expose  their  obvious  and  tundamental  errors  with  as  much  perspi¬ 
cuity  as  possible.  Instead  of  meeting  the  facts  and  reasoning  of  the 
minority  report,  the  Secretary  and  his  assistant  appear  to  have  desired 
to  break  their  force  by  selecting  a  single  fact ,  and  crying  out  against  it. 
The  object  of  the  minority  report  was  to  obtain  and  establish  truth  ; 
and  the  object  of  this  supplementary  report  is  to  fortify  the  leading  opin¬ 
ion  expressed  in  that  report,  viz :  that  the  railroad  routes  were  economi¬ 
cally  impracticable,  and  the  surveys  and  estimates  of  the  engineers  su¬ 
perficial  and  unreliable.  That  opinion  is  based  on  truth,  whether  the 
minority  of  the  committee  has  knowledge  enough  of  the  subject,  and  a 
sufficient  command  of  language,  to  make  it  evident  or  not.  And  no  con¬ 
troversial  art  will  be  able  to  succeed, by  making  an  outcry  about  some  one 
of  many  engineering  mistakes,  in  attracting  attention  from  the  super¬ 
ficialness  of  the  surveys,  and  the  consequent  unreliability  of  the  esti¬ 
mates.  To  make  the  true  issue  clear  :  the  route  most  fair  to  all  sec¬ 
tions,  and  which  seemed  most  likely  of  any  to  be  found  practicable, 
was  not  selected  to  be  surveyed :  those  routes  which  were  selected 
were  superficially  surveyed  :  the  estimates  of  amounts  of  grades, 
curves,  and  distances,  as  well  as  of  the  cost  of  a  road,  on  either  route, 
are  not  reliable :  the  estimates  of  the  amount  of  either  freight  or 
travel,  over  either  route,  are  not  even  probable,  as  the  minority  report 
demonstrated  beyond  the  power  of  cavil. 

These  errors,  going  both  to  the  selection  and  to  the  surveys  of  the 
routes,  and  to  the  estimates  based  on  the  knowledge  gained,  have  been 
examined  solely  that  the  House  may  be  able  to  safely  judge  how  far 
our  knowledge  of  what  would  be  the  cost  of  building  a  railroad  really 
extends,  and  not  from  a  desire  to  censure.  In  fact,  it  was  personally 
painful  to  be  obliged  to  censure  in  a  case  where  it  would  have  been  a 
pleasure  to  approve  ;  but  justice  will  not  permit  an  approval  of  super¬ 
ficial  surveys,  unreliable  estimates,  or  of  recommendations  of  routes, 
when  those  recommendations  were  made  before  the  relative  merits  of 
the  routes  were  actually  known  even  to  the  limited  extent  shown  by  the 
surveys.  The  routes  were  badly  selected  by  the  Secretary,  but  his  re¬ 
commendation  of  a  route  before  the  relative  merits  of  each  were  known 
is  still  more  unfortunate  ;  neither  act  of  the  Secretary  can  be  conscien¬ 
tiously  approved  by  the  undersigned  :  They  are  thus  broadly  stated 
in  pure  self-defence. 

One  great  cause  of  these  unfortunate  errors  of  the  Secretary  is  to  be 
found  in  the  unreliable  estimates  of  Captain  Humphreys  ;  another  in 


10 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


the  extremely  superficial  manner  in  which  the  surveys  were  executed 
hy  most  or  all  of  the  engineers. 

Take  the  case  of  Colonel  Fremont,  the  pioneer  in  this  business  of 
army  exploration  of  routes.  He  passed  through  the  country,  making 
general  observations  upon  its  appearance,  and  ascertaining  the  heights 
and  the  latitude  and  longitude  of  leading  passes  in  the  mountains  ; 
hut  he  did  not  ascertain  the  grades  and  curves  of  a  route  to  and  from 
important  passes.  So  with  Emory,  Marcy,  Sitgreaves,  Johnston, 
Stanshury,  Abert,  and  others.  Their  opinions  of  the  value  of  a  route 
for  a  railroad  were,  from  this  cause,  of  little  worth — not  to  he  com¬ 
pared  with  those  of  men  like  Carson,  Bill  Williams,  and  Lareux  ; 
for,  if  in  anything,  they  ought  to  excel  those  mountain  guides  in  con¬ 
jecturing  the  grades  of  roads,  hut  did  not  even  in  that.  Colonel  Fre¬ 
mont  is  a  notable  instance  of  this.  Although,  when  a  youth,  he  had 
some  experience  in  railroad  building,  yet  he  believed  and  said  that 
there  was  scarcely  “  a  perceptible  rise’  ’  from  river  to  river  through 
the  Pass  El  Sangre  de  Christo.  The  instruments  subsequently  proved 
two  things — that  the  grade  exceeded  340  feet  to  the  mile,  and  that 
Lareux  was  right  when  saying,  the  year  before  the  survey  was  made, 
that  a  better  pass  could  be  found  in  that  neighborhood  than  the  one 
which  seemed  to  Fremont  to  he  without  a  “  perceptible  rise.” 

The  hulk  of  the  explorations  was,  therefore,  so  vague,  loose,  and  in¬ 
definite  as  to  he  of  little  practical  worth.  The  explorations  had,  to 
he  sure,  ascertained  the  heights  of  certain  mountain  passes  in  different 
parts  of  the  country  ;  and  in  so  far  as  that  fact  and  their  general  ob¬ 
servations  went  to  show  the  mildness  or  the  rigors  of  winter,  could 
he  used.  For  instance,  they  ascertained,  from  actual  observation, 
that  in  certain  passes,  in  certain  latitudes,  the  snow  lies  unmelted 
until  “the  latter  end  of  June.” 

To  this  amount  and  kind  of  knowledge  Congress  proposed  to  add 
something  more  definite  and  satisfactory .  Has  the  Secretary  caused 
that  intention  to  be  fulfilled  ? 

This  is  best  answered  hy  examining  the  information  itself.  Take, 
for  example,  the  Cajon  Pass,  which  was  examined  hy  two  of  the  prin¬ 
cipal  engineers,  who  were  sent  into  the  field  with  instruments  in  their 
hands.  Captain  Humphreys  says,  (see  vol.  1  p.  88:)  “Lieutenant 
Williamson  is  of  opinion  that  these  high  grades  cannot  he  reduced. 
Lieutenant  Whipple  thinks  that  they  can.” 

Upon  this  it  is  deemed  proper  to  remark  that  Congress  had  not,  nor 
has  any  conceivable  use  for  idle  opinions  about  the  grades  through 
important  passes,  but  may  be  supposed  to  desire  an  actual  ascertain¬ 
ment  of  the  best  attainable  grades  at  a  reasonable  cost.  Actual  results 
have  a  positive,  opinions  only  a  negative  value. 

A  close  examination  of  the  report  of  Lieutenant  Whipple  inspires 
the  examiner  with  a  high  opinion  of  his  industry  and  science,  and 
occasions  a  regret  that  the  explorer  did  not  give  a  wider  scope  to  his 
topographical  observations,  and  actually  examine  what  hid  fair  to 
improve.  On  the  33d  page  of  his  report  he  thus  briefly  describes  the 
Memphis  and  San  Francisco  route  : 

“  For  a  great  portion  of  the  route  from  the  Mississippi  we  followed  natural  channels,  where 
streams  flow  nearly  east  and  west.  The  river  Arkansas  and  the  Canadian  lead  us  to  the  base 
of  the  Rocky  mountains.  Thence  crossing  table-lands  to  Rio  Pecos,  we  ascend  to  the  head 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


11 


of  the  Galisteo,  which  is  followed  to  Rio  del  Norte.  Descending  Rio  del  Norte  to  Albu¬ 
querque,  we  cross  to  the  Puerco  and  join  Rio  San  Jose,  which  leads  to  Ojo  del  Oso,  near 
Campbell’s  Pass,  the  summit  of  Sierra  Madre.  We  now  reach  Rio  Puerco  of  the  west,  which 
furnishes  a  valley  to  Rio  Colorado  Chiquito.  The  latter  carries  us  to  Chevelon’s  fork,  where 
we  turn  westward,  crossing  the  final  spur  of  Mogoyon  mountain  and  the  headwaters  of  Rio 
San  Francisco,  to  a  branch  of  Rio  Santa  Maria,  (Bill  Williams’  fork,)  which  leads  to  the 
Colorado.  Thence  we  would  propose  to  ascend  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mojave  river,  and  follow 
the  bed  of  that  stream  to  the  base  of  Sierra  Nevada.  The  route  should  traverse,  thence,  the 
northern  slope  of  the  San  Bernardino  spur,  which  is  said  to  furnish  numerous  rivulets,  bear¬ 
ing  clear  waters  into  the  sandy  plains  below.  Approaches  from  the  east  to  the  various  passes 
in  this  range — ‘Walker’s,’  ‘Canada  de  las  Uvas,’  and  ‘Tejon’ — are  known  to  be  favor¬ 
able.  To  examine  these  passes  minutely,  in  order  to  determine  that  which  shall  be  available 
for  a  railway  to  San  Francisco,  was  a  duty  intrusted  to  another,  whose  labors,  it  is  hoped, 
will  be  crowned  with  success.” 

It  is  now  proposed  to  call  attention  to  the  manner  in  which  the 
work  of  exploring  and  surveying  this  route,  as  thus  described  by 
Lieutenant  Whipple,  was  done,  that  the  House  may  see  how  little 
is  really  known  about  it  by  the  engineers  who  surveyed  it,  and  of 
how  little  value  all  estimates  based  on  such  explorations  and  surveys 
must  necessarily  he. 

Before  doing  so,  it  is  honestly  due  to  Lieutenant  Whipple  to  say, 
in  the  most  explicit  manner,  that  his  examinations  appear  to  have 
been  conducted  with  as  much  industry,  science,  and  zeal  as  those  of 
either  of  his  compeers  ;  that  it  is  believed  his  first  estimates  will, 
though  far  too  low,  prove  more  nearly  correct,  should  government 
ever  commit  the  error  of  building  a  railroad,  than  the  estimates  of 
either  of  the  gentlemen  having  in  charge  the  survey  of  a  route  ;  and 
that  his  error  consists,  not  in  making  his  first  estimates  too  high,  hut 
in  accepting  the  data  of  his  official  superiors,  and  then  so  reducing  his 
estimates  as  to  make  them  correspond  with  their  necessarily  vague  ideas 
of  what  a  road  running  through  sandy  deserts  and  uninhabited  moun¬ 
tains  would  cost.  To  reduce  his  estimates  to  their  ideas  of  what  they 
ought  to  he,  seems  to  have  required  a  subtraction  of  some  $81, 000, 000 — 
less  the  addition  made  to  Lieutenant  Whipple’s  estimates  by  Captain 
Humphreys.  So  much  seems  to  he  justly  due  to  this  engineer.  His 
fault  will  also  he  found  to  be,  from  the  extracts  about  to  be  submitted, 
a  want  of  thoroughness  in  his  topographical  examinations — a  fault 
common  to  all  military  engineers  hitherto  employed  by  government 
on  such  explorations,  not  one,  so  far,  having  made  to  Congress  a  com¬ 
plete  railroad  (i  survey  ”  of  a  well  defined  route.  And  without  such 
detailed  and  accurate  survey,  “  estimates  of  cost”  are  but  rude  con¬ 
jectures,  upon  which  sensible  men  will  not  invest  money. 

On  page  26  of  his  report,  Lieutenant  Whipple  says: 

“Although  our  route  equalled  all  we  had  reason  to  anticipate,  it  yet  seems  probable  that 
the  main  eastern  branch  would  lead  through  a  more  favorable  country,  by  the  Black  mountain 
to  ‘  Val  de  Chino.’  Thence  a  reconnaissance  eastwardly  might  discover  a  passage  through 
the  Black  Forest  across  the  headwaters  of  Rio  San  Francisco,  and  unite  with  our  trail  upon 
Canon  Diablo,  near  the  Colorado  Chiquito.” 

The  truth  of  these  suppositions  was  not  ascertained.  He  passed 
out  to  the  Colorado  river  ;  and,  on  same  page,  says : 

“Upon  the  opposite  side  seemed  a  succession  of  mountains,  which,  receding  from  the 
river  towards  the  northwest,  terminated  about  ten  miles  above.  There  a  wide  plain  seemed 
to  extend  indefinitely  westward,  and  possibly  might  lead  in  about  one  hundred  miles  to  San 
Gorgonio  Pass,  the  fine  puerto  discovered  by  Lieutenant  Williamson,  to  the  valley  of  Los 
Angeles.” 

Neither  was  this  route,  thus  opening  before  them,  explored.  On 


12 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


the  contrary,  he  ascended  the  river  several  miles,  until  he  was  “  met 
by  Mojaves,  who,  acting  as  guides  around  the  next  spur  that  formed 
a  canon,  conducted  the  surveying  party  through  a  pass,  invisible  from 
the  river ,  where  not  a  hill  intervened/' 

After  describing  the  difficulties  in  the  way  between  the  Colorado 
and  the  Mohave  rivers,  Lieutenant  Whipple  says,  on  page  30 : 

“Whether  a  channel  exists  by  which  the  Mojave  river  finds  its  way  to  the  Colorado,  is  a 
problem  not  yet  solved.  We  regretted  exceedingly  that  time  for  a  closer  examination  was 
not  at  our  disposal.  Our  trusty  Indian  guide,  however,  assured  us  that  the  dry  channel  of 
that  stream  passed  uninterruptedly  north  of  our  route  to  the  Colorado,  and  that  wagons  could 
pass  through  it  without  encountering  a  hill.  Such  a  route  as  he  describes,  with  water  found 
by  digging,  is  undoubtedly  the  most  favorable  for  a  railway  that  exists  across  the  desert 
west  from  the  Colorado  river.” 

Does  a  good  route  exist  between  the  Colorado  and  the  passes  in  the 
Sierra  Nevada  ?  Did  the  Indian  tell  the  truth  ?  Or  does  the  Mohave 
sink  in  the  ground?  The  surveyors  cannot  tell. 

Mr.  Campbell,  a  civil  engineer,  and  an  aid  of  Lieutenant  Whipple, 
in  a  few  sensible  remarks  appended  to  the  report,  suggests  several 
points  where  the  route  might  probably  be  improved — the  following 
instance  is  taken  from  page  38  : 

“Between  camps  Nos  120  and  121,  Big  Sandy  unites  with  Bill  Williams’  fork,  which 
comes  from  the  northeast.  From  a  careful  examination  of  my  topographical  notes,  triangu¬ 
lations,  deductions,  &c.,  I  feel  confident  in  stating  my  opinion  as  to  the  source  of  this  fork — 
that  it  is  in  a  pass  which  we  saw  some  few  miles  to  the  south  of  us,  between  the  Black 
mountain  and  Mount  Hope.  By  a  slight  detour  in  the  Val  de  Chino,  this  pass  can  be 
attained,  and  the  valley  of  Bill  Williams  occupied  for  the  route,  thereby  saving  about  fifty 
miles  of  distance  and  the  probability  of  an  uninterrupted  descent  of  about  twenty- eight  feet 
per  mile.  ” 

On  page  39,  Mr.  Campbell  says  :  “  Thence  turning  southeasterly  to 
a  junction  with  the  Sierra  Nevada,  at  the  San  Bernardino  mountain, 
the  exploration  continued  west  and  through  a  pass  in  the  highest 
point  of  this  river,  there  being  much  lower  ground  both  to  the  north 
and  south  of  this  point,  as  shown  by  the  map/' 

It  is  due  to  Lieutenant  Whipple  to  give  the  reason  assigned  by  him 
for  his  hurrying  forward,  leaving  important  openings  unexplored — it 
is  found  on  page  27  : 

“  But  our  time  was  precious ;  it  was  doubtful  whether,  with  the  utmost  diligence,  we  could 
reach  the  settlements  before  our  supply  of  subsistence  should  be  exhausted.  Therefore,  aban¬ 
doning  our  wagons,  except  a  light  vehicle  to  which  was  attached  the  viameter,  and  in  which 
the  lighter  instruments  were  carried,  we  packed  upon  mules  our  collections,  provisions,  and 
cached  such  things  as  we  could  spare.” 

This  was  in  the  valley  of  the  Colorado  river,  550  or  600  miles  from 
San  Francisco,  and  fully  accounts  for  liis  neglect  to  find  the  outlet  of 
the  Mohave  river,  and  thus  obtain  an  easy  grade  from  the  Colorado 
river  to  the  passes  of  the  Sierra  Nevada,  if  one  existed.  He  lacked  the 
means. 

Here  it  may  be  proper  to  remark  that  Congress  lacks  information 
in  relation  to  the  country  lying  between  the  passes  in  the  Sierra 
Nevada  and  the  Colorado  river,  of  the  country  lying  between  the 
Colorado  and  Zuni,  and  of  the  valley  of  the  Colorado  river  itself — 
that  important  information  could  have  been  obtained  with  the  money 
unwisely  expended  on  the  impracticable  Coo-cha-topa  route. 

Such  is  the  character  of  the  information  obtained  for  the  use  of 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


13 


Congress  under  the  instructions  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  It  appears 
to  he  fully  equal  to  that  obtained  in  relation  to  other  routes.  The  Sec¬ 
retary  says,  (vol.  i,  page  22,  quarto  edition:)  44  The  exploration  of 
the  route  by  Lieutenant  Whipple,  and  his  report  thereon,  are  entitled 
to  the  highest  commendation  for  the  completion  of  the  work  in  all  its 
parts,  the  full  and  exact  observations  which  he  made  for  the  deter¬ 
mination  of  longitudes  and  latitudes,  and  the  wide  range  of  scientific 
research  which  he  instituted  into  all  the  collateral  branches  connected 
with  the  question  which  his  exploration  was  designed  to  solve.” 

This  is  as  high  praise  as  that  bestowed  upon  the  surveys  of  any  other 
route,  and  probably  is,  in  all  respects,  as  well  deserved.  Still,  it  is 
not  believed  by  the  undersigned  to  be  that  kind  of  information  which 
could  he  used  by  an  experienced  railroad  engineer  when  making  44  re¬ 
liable  ”  estimates  of  cost.  Mr.  Campbell  says,  page  40  : 

“  To  make  a  minute  estimate  of  the  probable  co^t  of  a  railway  from  the  Mississippi  to  the 
Pacific,  cannot  come  within  the  province  of  this  exploration  ;  it  being  well  known  that,  for  such 
a  purpose,  the  most  accurate  and  detailed  measurements  are  required.  The  barometric 
observations,  however,  have  developed  a  most  interesting  profile,  and  are  sufficiently  reliable 
to  determine  the  great  question  of  practicability  beyond  a  doubt.” 

No  one  can  doubt  that  it  is  possible  to  build  a  railroad  on  either 
route  yet  explored;  it  is  44  practicable  ”  to  build  one  even  over  Coo- 
cha-topa  ;  hut  it  is  doubted,  by  many  considerate  persons,  whether  it 
is  44  practicable”  to  build  a  road  upon  any  route  yet  explored  at  a 
cost  that  ivould  justify  the  expenditure  ;  it  is  unquestionably  doubtful 
whether  a  road  would  yield  enough  revenue  to  run  it  and  keep  it  in 
repair. 

But,  say  some,  suppose  the  road  never  should  earn  enough  to  be  able 
to  repay  a  shilling  of  either  principal  or  interest  of  the  cost  of  build¬ 
ing  it ;  suppose  even  an  annual  expenditure  necessary  to  keep  the 
railroad  in  repair,  the  same  is  true  of  fortifications,  ships  of  war,  and 
all  military  defences  possessed  by  a  nation  ;  and  therefore,  if  a  rail¬ 
road  is  a  suitable,  efficient,  and  (in  the  event  of  war)  a  necessary  means 
of  defence,  the  government  ought  to  build  it.  Let  this  assertion  of 
the  friends  of  a  government  road  be  considered  a  moment,  especially 
as  the  building  of  a  railroad  is  looked  upon  with  interest  by  the  Sec¬ 
retary  of  War  from  what  he  calls  considerations  “of  a  strictly  military 
character .”  Considered  even  from  this  point  of  view,  the  44  estimates” 
of  the  engineers,  and  the  reasonings  and  recommendations  based  on 
them  by  the  Secretary,  are  44  unreliable” — obviously  and  strikingly 
unreliable. 

The  Secretary,  in  his  annual  report  of  1855,  says  (see  p.  15)  a 
few  ships  would  suffice  to  blockade  the  Pacific  ports  of  the  United 
States,  and  that  this  military  consideration,  amongst  others,  causes 
him  to  examine  44  with  interest  all  projects  promising  the  accomplish¬ 
ment  of  a  railroad  communication  between,”  &c.,  &c.  Having  these 
and  other  44  considerations  of  a  strictly  military  character”  in  view, 
as  well  as  the  feasibility  and  economy  of  the  route,  the  Secretary,  in 
the  most  pointed  and  explicit  terms,  recommends,  as  preferable  to  all 
others  on  this  continent  within  our  jurisdiction,  a  line  of  railroad  com¬ 
munication  running  many  hundreds  of  miles  directly  along  the  borders 
of  a  neighboring  nation ;  that  nation  and  powerful  allies  would,  to 
adopt  the  language  of  the  Secretary,  have  the  44  choice  of  time  and 


14 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


place”  to  attack  and  seize  that  line  of  communication.  Suppose  it 
broken  off  in  the  deserts,  or  near  the  head  of  the  Gulf  of  California, 
where  the  army  of  the  invader  could  easily  and  cheaply  derive  sup¬ 
plies  from  a  co-operative  fleet,  does  the  Secretary  propose  to  despatch 
to  those  distant  deserts  and  maintain  from  the  Mississippi  valley  an 
army  to  compete  with  a  hostile  army  which  draws  copious  supplies 
from  a  fleet  lying  perhaps  within  a  few  rods  of  his  camp  ?  How  long 
would  it  take  a  hostile  and  well-appointed  army  to  construct  fortifica¬ 
tions  at  the  Colorado,  which,  aided  hy  u  comparatively  few  ships” 
lying  in  the  river  to  protect  the  works  with  their  guns,  could  not  he 
captured  except  hy  a  regular  siege,  as  was  Sebastopol  ?  Or  is  it  pro¬ 
posed  hy  the  Secretary  to  construct  military  works  along  the  whole 
line  of  his  favorite  border  communication  to  secure  it  against  inter¬ 
ruption  in  time  of  war  ?  If  so,  before  entering  upon  the  building  of 
his  border  road,  estimates  of  cost  of  fortifications  to  defend  it  should 
be  submitted  to  Congress,  that  we  may  know,  in  advance,  what  this 
“  defensive  military  contrivance”  is  to  cost  the  United  States  ;  else  it 
might  happen  to  us  as  to  the  u  foolish  man”  who  began  to  build  and 
was  not  able  to  finish. 

A  few  words  more  upon  this  point.  Mexico  is  a  feeble  nation,  and 
is  not  able  to  prevent  (even  if  it  did  not  combine  against  us)  a  mari¬ 
time  nation  at  war  with  the  United  States  from  sending  a  fleet  to  the 
head  of  the  Gulf  of  California  to  seize  the  communication  between 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  States.  An  international  right  to  do  so  would 
undoubtedly  be  set  up  by  the  belligerent.  That  communication  broken 
off,  and  of  what  benefit  would  be  the  vast  expenditure  on  that  border 
railroad,  made  under  the  delusive  idea  that  it  would  be  beneficial  in  time 
of  war  ?  To  be  useful  in  time  of  war,  it  would  have  to  be  made  in¬ 
vulnerable  to  attack.  To  make  it  thus  invulnerable  in  time  of  war, 
what  would  be  the  cost?  Upon  this  important  point  u  of  a  strictly 
military  character”  not  a  solitary  estimate  has  been  submitted  !  And 
yet  the  tremendous  war  vessels  prepared  by  the  British  and  French 
with  which  to  attack  Cronstadt,  had  the  war  been  continued  another 
year,  or  any  other  similar  naval  force,  could,  it  is  believed,  sail  directly 
up  to  the  very  line  of  the  road,  six  hundred  miles  from  San  Francisco 
and  east  of  the  great  Colorado  desert ! 

If  this  railroad  is,  bona  fide,  to  be  built  as  a  great  means  of  securing 
a  stout  “  military  defence  of  California”  in  time  of  war,  as  pretended 
by  some  of  its  advocates  ;  and  if  the  Secretary  of  War  really  favors  it 
upon  that  ground,  why  was  not  an  estimate  of  the  cost  of  erecting  such 
military  works  as  are  indispensably  necessary  to  defend  the  railroad  sent 
in  ?  Otherwise,  Congress  might  as  well  build  forts  without  bomb-proof 
magazines,  or  without  guns  or  mortars  ;  it  is  as  necessary  to  secure  as 
it  is  to  construct  a  military  road.  The  estimates  are,  therefore,  defi¬ 
cient,  and  necessarily  “  unreliable.” 

But  California  needs  no  such  costly  methods  of  military  defence.  F ew 
countries  on  the  globe,  of  like  extent  and  importance,  are  so  easily  made 
defensible.  Few  countries,  of  even  far  larger  population,  can  com¬ 
pare  with  California  in  the  extent  of  its  military  power.  Its  popula¬ 
tion  is  eminently  warlike,  and  trained  to  an  expert  use  of  arms.  True, 
an  arsenal  of  construction,  situated  beyond  the  reach  of  a  hostile  fleet, 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


15 


and  yet  easily  accessible  to  our  troops,  (like  that  at  Watervliet,)  is  a 
necessity  to  California,  and  ought,  long  ere  this,  to  have  been  supplied. 
So,  also,  arsenals  of  depot  and  repair.  And  so,  also,  complete  military 
defences  to  command  the  few  inlets,  harbors,  and  anchorages  on  the 
coast.  This  done,  and  thoroughly  done ,  and  the  people  of  California, 
like  the  people  upon  the  Atlantic  coast,  may  he  confidently  relied  on 
to  furnish  patriotic  men  (and  enough  provisions,  clothing,  &c.,  for 
the  troops  raised)  to  repel  all  enemies.  Their  ability  and  their 
patriotism  may  be  relied  on  with  unhesitating  confidence ;  and  woe 
to  the  enemy  that  shall  invade  them,  presuming  upon  their  lack  of 
either  ! 

It  is  to  he  hoped  the  military  authorities  will  elaborate  a  perfect 
system  of  defence,  and  submit  carefully  prepared  estimates  therefor, 
and  that  Congress  will  wisely  and  liberally  appropriate  money  for  its 
construction  ;  but  will  leave  railroads  to  be  constructed,  as  they  have 
heretofore  been  constructed,  by  the  intelligently  directed  enterprise  of 
individuals  who  are  engaged  in  the  business  of  conveying  freights 
and  passengers.  This  policy  has  been  safely  adhered  to  in  the  past ; 
why  distrust  it  in  the  future?  The  freighting  and  passenger  business 
has,  so  far,  been  well  conducted  by  individuals,  both  on  the  land  and 
on  the  sea.  Why,  then,  shall  government  seek  to  enter  into  the  busi¬ 
ness  and  engage  in  a  contest  with  competitors  so  experienced  and  so 
skillful?  Government  has  ardently  desired  roads  along  the  fron¬ 
tiers,  and  from  the  frontiers  to  the  interior;  and^to  obtain  them, 
relied  on  the  enterprise  of  its  citizens.  That  reliance  has  proved 
well  founded ,  even  to  an  extent  far  beyond  tbe  first  hopes  of  the  most 
sanguine.  What  justification,  then,  has  Congress,  amid  the  blaze 
of  this  brilliant  success,  for  abandoning  this  reliance  upon  the 
people,  and  for  rushing  into  a  business  for  which  governments 
have  no  aptitude?  Will  not  patience,  and  a  “  masterly  inactivity,” 
and  leaving  the  ground  unoccupied  by  government,  and  open  to  the 
enterprise  of  individuals,  soonest  achieve  the  construction  of  all  feasible 
and  profitable  roads  ?  And  the  roads  required  by  the  wants  of  trade 
are  generally,  if  not  always,  coincident  with  those  required  by  the 
engineer  for  military  defence.  In  twenty-five  years,  more  than  25,000 
miles  of  railroad  have  been  built ;  in  ten  years  more,  the  roads  from  the 
Mississippi  river  will  be  carried  up  to  the  extreme  western  borders  of 
the  western  settlements,  and  California  will  have  roads  extending  east¬ 
ward  at  once  numerous  and  complete.  When  this  shall  have  been  done , 
the  two  systems  will  be  united,  if  business  will  justify  it;  and,  if  done, 
government  will  do  as  it  ever  has  done — it  will  pay,  as  other  customers 
do,  for  all  freight  and  all  passengers  it  sends  over  railroads.  This  policy 
has  been  deemed  wise,  just,  and  statesmanlike — who  can  prove  it  un¬ 
wise,  or  that  it  is  unjust  ?  or  demonstrate  that  it  is  no  longer  suitable 
to  our  condition  ? 

Believing  that  the  policy  of  leaving  the  construction  of  Roads  and 
Canals  to  the  States  and  to  the  people  ought  not  to  be  abandoned,  but 
conscientiously  adhered  to,  the  minority  report  was  made  in  its  de¬ 
fence.  An  adherence  to  the  policy  of  our  fathers  is  recommended  by 
the  very  deficiencies  exhibited  by  our  eminent  military  men,  whom 
we  have  unwisely  endeavored  to  suddenly  convert  into  railroad  engi- 


16 


PACIFIC  RAILROAD. 


neers.  Of  our  public  men,  from  tlie  President  to  the  humblest  revenue 
collector,  how  few  are  competent  to  decide  where  and  liow  railroads 
shall  be  built !  And  of  the  cost  and  management  of  such  structures, 
what  do  our  army,  navy,  or  department  officers  really  and  practically 
know?  If  an  exhibition  of  the  imperfectness  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
best  informed  of  the  government  office-holders  in  relation  to  railroads 
shall  tend  to  preserve  this  government  from  improper  enterprises, 
every  end  had  in  view  by  the  undersigned  will  have  been  attained. 
If  a  railroad  ought  to  be  built,  it  ought  to  be  located  on  that  route  xohich 
is  so  situated  as  to  reasonably  well  accommodate  all ,  or  nearly  all ,  of  the 
several  States.  If  a  railroad  ought  to  be  built,  it  should  only  be  done 
after  detailed  surveys  have  been  made  by  men  whose  regular  business 
it  is  to  make  them.  A  route  that  would  conveniently  accommodate 
the  greater  number  of  States  both  north  and  south  not  having  been 
thoroughly  surveyed ,  it  is  held  that  Congress  has  not  information  enough 
laid  before  it  to  justify  a  location,  even  if  it  desired  to  make  one  ;  after 
making  a  deduction  of  $81,000,000  from  one  set  of  estimates  laid  be¬ 
fore  us  to  guide  our  judgments,  it  is  indicated  that  a  further  one  may 
yet  be  expected  ! 

Hoping  that  this  further  examination  of  the  subject,  in  reply  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  and  Captain  Humphreys,  may  shed  some  further 
light  upon  the  nature  and  value  of  the  estimates,  the  whole  matter  is 
submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the  House. 


Z.  KIDWELL. 


